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TOWARD HEIGHTENING IMPARTIALITY IN
SOCIAL SECURITY AGENCY PROCEEDINGS
INVOLVING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES*
Victor G. Rosenblum**
As an academic who has studied, observed and admired the
selection and performance of Administrative Law Judges over the past
thirty years, I've been puzzled and troubled by misguided endeavors of
some Social Security Agency officials to constrict commitment to
impartiality by circumscribing the decisional independence of ALJs.
A prototype of myopic perception of ALJs' duties was presented
in SSA General Counsel Arthur Fried's memorandum of January 1997
on "Legal Foundations of the Duty of Impartiality in the Hearing
Process and its Applicability to Administrative Law Judges."'
Preoccupied with viewing ALJs as agency personnel subordinate to
policy making officials in the hierarchy of power, the General
Counsel's memorandum was devoid of
implementation of
Administrative Procedure Act or Supreme Court provisions that
focused on the integrity of ALJ decision making. The memorandum's
emphasis on a hierarchical analysis of agency-ALJ relationships also
failed to probe the roles and impact of U.S. Courts of Appeals'
decisions construing the contours and boundaries of Agency authority
and their bearing on ALJ duties.
This article endeavors a) to examine the dysfunctionality of the
General Counsel's narrow conception of impartiality in his
memorandum b) to recognize problems posed for Agency and ALJ
impartiality by dissonance between Agency policies and appellate court
rulings and c) to suggest feasible steps toward and potential benefits
from adoption of a collegial, rather than hierarchical, approach to
agency-AJ ties.
58

'This is an expanded version of a presentation given in August, 1997, following the
preceding presentations.
-Professor of Law, Northwestern University.
'Hereinafter referred to as Fried Memorandum. Bearing the date January 18, 1997,
the memorandum commenced with the declaration that "the highest quality and most efficient
service of the ALJ corps is undermined by the differing and often contradictory understanding
in various parts of the Agency of such 'decisional independence."' at 1.
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a)

-9

Dysfunctionality of the General Counsel's Conception of
Impartiality

rather than
I chose the word "dysfunctionality"
of
conception
Counsel's
"disingenuousness" in examining the General
impartiality to accord the memorandum benefit of the doubt. It seemed
clear from text and tone, nonetheless, that the memorandum's primacy
of focus was not on expanding impartiality but on contracting it as an
accompaniment to eliminating alleged "confusion" over the meaning of
ALJ "decisional independence" and its bearing on the power of the
Agency "to manage the performance of the ALJ corps." 2
Then-Commissioner of Social Security Chater emphasized that
the mission of the General Counsel's memorandum was "to provide me
with a clear articulation of this relationship" between "the Agency's
management authority over its ALJs" and "the protections afforded to
3
claimants under the Administrative Procedure Act." Rather than
probing how the mandate of impartiality can be enhanced through
Agency and ALU interactions, the memorandum sought to justify
expansion of Agency power to direct and control ALJ actions. The
Agency was proclaimed possessor of the power to establish and enforce
"administrative practices and programmatic policies that ALJs must
follow." Only at the point that Agency actions "abridge" impartiality
can the Agency's authority to prescribe, define, and enforce such
directives for ALJs as "training," "performance goals" and "quality
assurance programs" be questioned.4
I believe that the members of Congress who voted unanimously
to adopt the Administrative Procedure Act did not intend the
requirement of impartiality to become an isolated or limited component
of the statute in operation. Impartiality was an obligation, a mandate
that pervaded the statute's aspirations and directives as well as what
Justice Jackson described as its "formula" and Justice Frankfurter its
''mood."
Senator McCarran, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee at the
time of passage, aptly summarized Congressional intent in his
Foreword to the Legislative History of the Administrative Procedure
Act. He labeled it "a solemn undertaking of official fairness" that

2

Fried Memorandum, at 1.
introductory note to Fried Memorandum.
'Commissioner's
4
Fried Memorandum, at 18.
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"brings into relief the ever essential declaration that this is a
government of law rather than of men."5 This view of the 1946 statute
was echoed in 1950 in the Supreme Court's ruling in Wong Yang Sung
v. McGrath.6 Justice Jackson stressed in his opinion that the APA was
fueled by the "conviction" that the expanding power of federal
administrative agencies "was not sufficiently safeguarded and
sometimes was put to arbitrary and biased use." 7 Recognition of the
need for reform by Congress of the administrative process reflected
"concern over administrative impartiality and response to growing
discontent."' The APA represented "a long period of study and strife"
and enacted a "formula upon which opposing social and political forces
have come to rest." 9 Fundamental to that "formula" were "the purpose
to curtail and change the practice of embodying in one person or agency
the duties of prosecutor and judge"' and the effort to "escape from
these subversive influences" that have produced the atmosphere "that
threatens the impartial performance of that judicial work"" by the
agencies. Justice Jackson cited as a theme "reiterated throughout the
legislative history of the Act" the view that impartial performance is
threatened particularly when "the discretionary work of the
administration is merged with that of the judge."' 2 He maintained that
an indispensable component of fair hearing was the role of examinersnow ALJs- "whose independence and tenure are so guarded by the
Act as to give the assurance of neutrality which Congress thought
would guarantee the impartiality of the administrative process." 3
Justice Frankfurter made a historic determination about
correlations between impartiality and the roles of Administrative Law
Judges in the Donnelly Garment case in 19474 and in the Universal
Camera case in 1951. 5 Alleged bias of examiners was a central theme
of the Donnelly litigation. After a remand to the National Labor

'Legislative History of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, S. Doc. No. 248,
79th Congress,
at iii.
6
Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
7
Id. at 37
8
id.
9
1d., at 41.
'Old., at 41.
1Id., at 42.
121d.
3
Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. at 52.
4
I NLRB v. Donnelly Garment, 330 U.S. 219 (1947).
"Universal Camera v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
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Relations Board was ordered by the Court of Appeals for a fair hearing
on an unfair labor practice charge, the company objected that the
examiner should be disqualified as biased because he had in the
previous hearing rejected as valueless the very evidence he was now
ordered by the Court of Appeals to receive. After the examiner found
again that Donnelly had committed unfair labor practices, the Court of
Appeals held that the NLRB should have assigned a different examiner
to the second hearing because the continuing impartiality of the original
examiner was called into question by his rulings and findings at the first
hearing.
A unanimous Supreme Court reversed. Justice Frankfurter
maintained that the examiner's prior rulings did not evidence bias.
Analogizing hearing examiners to judges, Justice Frankfurter first
found that "Certainly it is not the rule of judicial administration, that,
statutory requirements apart, a judge is disqualified from sitting in a
retrial because he was reversed on earlier rulings."' 6 He then stressed
that "We find no warrant for imposing upon administrative agencies a
stiffer rule, whereby examiners would be disentitled to sit because they
ruled strongly against a party in the first hearing."17 The message of
Donnelly was clear: ALJs perform judicial decisional roles and are
subject to the same standards as other judges regarding disqualification.
Ruling strongly against a party on the record of a prior proceeding does
not establish actual bias or lack of impartiality by a judge or ALJ.
In Universal Camera v. NLRB, Justice Frankfurter focused for
the first time on whether courts must weigh hearing examiners' findings
in relation to those of higher agency officials in meeting the APA's
standard of substantial evidence. He reversed and remanded the
unanimous ruling of the Court of Appeals that, pursuant to the
Administrative Procedure Act and the National Labor Relations Act,
the court had to accept the agency's decision and not weigh the
examiner's fimdings as long as the agency's decision was within the
bounds of rational entertainment.
The key to Justice Frankfurter's conclusion that the examiner's
findings must be weighed by the reviewing court even though rejected
by the agency was the reference in the APA to consideration "upon the
whole record." While he was critical of Congress for incorporating the
APA into the statute books "with unquestioning--we might even say
6

Donnelly, 330 U.S. at 236. (citation omitted).
at 236-7.

17Id.,
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uncritical--unanimity," 8 he was impressed by the fact that the sponsors
of the legislation called for higher judicial standards in the exercise of
independent judgment by the reviewing courts on consideration of "the
whole record." The substantial evidence test cannot be met by
considering only whether the evidence supporting an agency's decision
was substantial by itself. The whole record has to be studied, and the
examiner's findings and report are integral parts of the whole record.
Likening Congress' action in passing the APA to having
"expressed a mood,"19 Justice Frankfurter insisted that, "As legislation,
that mood must be respected, even though it can only serve as a
standard for judgment and not as a body of rigid rules...." 20
Included in the legislation's "mood" that "must be respected"
were the APA's provisions "designed to maintain high standards of
independence and competence in examiners."' 2 ' Both the APA and the
NLRA "evince a purpose to increase the importance of the role of
examiners in the administrative process. High standards of public
administration counsel that we attribute to the Labor Board's examiners
both due regard for the responsibility which Congress imposes on them
22
and the competence to discharge it."

Regrettably and dysfunctionally, the memorandum of the Social
Security Agency's General Counsel drove backward from the APA's
breadth and depth of concern with the principle of impartiality and from
the implementations of it by the Supreme Court. Instead of
commending and enhancing the impartiality of ALJs, the memorandum
endeavored to confine their decisional independence and to warn of
disciplinary consequences if the ordered confinements were not heeded.
That the Supreme Court's seminal early decisions construing
decisional roles of ALJs in Donnelly, Wong Yang Sung and Universal
Camera bearing on impartiality of the administrative process received
short shrift in the General Counsel's selective invocations of Supreme
Court text might have been understandable if more recent cases dealing
with foundational obligations and immunities of ALJs had been probed.
The General Counsel's memorandum, for example, drew on the
Supreme Court's Ramspeck23 ruling in 1953 which had denied
"Universal Camera v. NLRB 340 U.S. 474, 482 (1951).
'9 1d., at 487.
2
od.
2
1d., at 495.
22

Id.

21Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners' Conference, 345 U.S. 128 (1953).
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examiners total independence from agency controls. Nonetheless the
memorandum did not develop the point that the justices in Ramspeck
agreed that a key objective of the APA was prevention of agency
abuses of examiners' integrity and impartiality. The thrust of the APA
regarding ALJs was held to be that hearing officers "were not to be
paid, promoted or discharged at the whim or caprice of the agency or
for political reasons."
Butz v. Economou24 made a salient contribution to the judicial
literature of ALJs' decisional independence in 1978, but the General
Counsel's memorandum bypassed Justice White's detailed analysis of
ALJ roles there as well.
In the course of probing the issue of immunity from suit,
Justice White maintained in his Butz opinion that "adjudication within
a federal administrative agency shares enough of the characteristics of
the judicial process that those who participate in such adjudication
should also be immune from suits for damages."25 He didn't stop there
but proceeded to expatiate in considerable detail:
More importantly, the process of agency
adjudication is currently structured so as to assure that
the hearing examiner exercises his independent
judgment on the evidence before him, free from
pressures by the parties or other officials within the
agency. Prior to the Administrative Procedure Act,
there was considerable concern that persons hearing
administrative cases at the trial level could not exercise
independent judgment because they were required to
perform prosecutorial and investigative functions as
well as their judicial work ...and because they were
often subordinate to executive officials within the
agency. . . . [T]he Administrative Procedure Act
contains a number of provisions designed to guarantee
the independence of hearing examiners. They may not
perform duties inconsistent with their duties as hearing
examiners. . . . When conducting a hearing under
[section] 5 of the APA ...a hearing examiner is not
responsible to, or subject to the supervision or direction
24

Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
Id., at 512-13.

25
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of, employees or agents engaged in the performance of
investigative or prosecution functions for the agency..
. . Nor may a hearing examiner consult any person or

party, including other agency officials, concerning a fact
at issue in the hearing, unless on notice and opportunity
for all parties to participate ....

Hearing examiners must

be assigned to cases in rotation so far as is practicable.
.

. .

They may be removed only for good cause

established and determined by the Civil Service
Commission after a hearing on the record.... Their pay

is also controlled by the Civil Service Commission.
In light of these safeguards, we think that the
risk of an unconstitutional act by one presiding at an
agency hearing is clearly outweighed by the importance
of preserving the independent judgment of these men
and women.26
Were these "safeguards" enumerated by Justice White to be
compromised and the "independent judgment" of ALJs supplanted with
Agency edicts promiscuously labeled "policy" by representatives of
management, the Supreme Court could well feel called-upon to reassess
its role in judicial review of agency actions and to replicate hostile,
adversarial relationships of yesteryear.
b)

Problems posed for impartiality by conflicts with appellate
court rulings.

In an insightful article in Judicature in 1997,27 Professors Susan
Haire and Stefanie Lindquist found that the Social Security
Administration "is subjected to widely varying degrees of support
among the circuits. And the infrequency with which the Supreme Court
reviews disability cases has meant that little has been done to cohere the
standards or approaches of the circuits.

'2'

The tensions that exist

between the Agency and reviewing courts account for serious

26

Id., at 513-14.
27Haire and Lindquist, "An Agency and Twelve Courts: Social Security Disability
Cases in the
United States Courts ofAppeal., 80 JUDICATURE 230 (1997).
28
Id., at 236.
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dissonance and disarray in the application of Social Security law and
received no consideration or analysis in the General Counsel's
memorandum beyond the insistence that an ALJ is bound to follow
Agency policy even if, in the ALJ's opinion, the policy is contrary to
law.929
Unconcerned with the impact of conflict between circuit courts
and the Agency, through which "balkanization has become an
institutional reality,"3' the General Counsel appeared to order ALJs to
stonewall in adherence to Agency policies in the face of overt court
rulings to the contrary. Given rulings such as the Fourth Circuit's that
federal agencies "are required to abide by the law of this court in
matters arising within the jurisdiction of this circuit until and unless it
is changed by this court or reversed by the Supreme Court of the United
States,"'" it is difficult to construe the General Counsel's instruction to
ALJs as anything but a requirement to engage in contempt of court.
My own random, unsystematic survey of recent courts of
appeals rulings on social security issues evinces frequent intrusions into
Agency practices and reversals or remands geared to judicial microscrutiny and management of decisional impartiality, such as application
of the substantial evidence requirement.
Typical recent rejections of Agency rulings or policies have
been:
Flanery v. Chatern in which a 2-1 panel of the Eighth
Circuit reversed the Agency and instructed the district
court to remand to the Commissioner for an award of
benefits, after finding that the ALJ placed "inordinate

29
Fried memorandum at 5-6. This absence of any consideration of these tensions
from the General Counsel's memorandum on the duty of impartiality suggests his reluctance
to discern any nexus between perceptions by courts of appeals regarding the scope of ALJs'
impartiality and the appellate judges' readiness to challenge or refute Agency decisions. Some
of Mr. Fried's earlier examinations of and commentaries about appellate court relationships
with the Agency contained constructive and creative insights into those relationships which
could and still should be enlarged upon in collegial dialogue with ALJs. See, e.g. Fried, A
Disability Appeal Primer, 9 Soc. Sec. Rep. Ser. 971 (1985) and Fried, the Sequential
Evaluation of Disability 145 PLI/Crim 7 (1987).
3
Haire and Lindquist at 236.
"Industrial Turn Around Corporation v. NLRB 115 F. 3d 248, 254, (4th Cir. 1997).
See also Iowa Utilities Board v. FCC 135 F. 3d 535, 540 (8th Cir. 1998), in which the
unanimous panel issued a writ of mandamus against the agency and declared that "a policy
argument bottomed on an agency's views of expediency can never justify an agency's
disregard of the existing mandate of a federal court in which the agency was a party litigant."
32
Flanery v. Chater 112 F. 3d 346 (8th Cir. 1997)
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emphasis on an isolated statement by a physician"
regarding the claimant's seizures and that the evidence
shows--contrary to the rulings of the AU and the
Appeals council--"that there would be no jobs in the
national economy that Flanery could perform."33
34 in which a per curiam panel of the
Likes v. Callahan,
Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded because the ALJ
erred in failing to consider the retrospective medical
diagnoses and the corroborating lay evidence relating
back to the claimed period of disability covering posttraumatic stress disorder stemming from duty in the
Vietnam War.
Porch v. Chater,' in which a unanimous Eighth Circuit
panel reversed the Agency's denial of benefits because
"the record does not contain substantial evidence to
support the finding of the AL" rejecting Porch's claim
of disability from debilitating pain due to disorders of
the spine. The court concluded that "the Commissioner
did not meet her burden of showing that there are other
jobs in the economy that Porch can perform" and that
the ALJ did not adequately credit either the claimant's
testimony regarding the side effects of her medications
or regarding her complaints of pain. The court even
rejected the AL's framing of a hypothetical question to
the vocational expert, maintaining that "the AU's
hypothetical question must include those impairments
that are substantially supported by the record as a
whole."36
Quinones v Chater," in which a unanimous Second
Circuit panel remanded to the AU to address evidence
in a minor's petition for supplemental security income
based on the 13 year old's claim of disability for dietary
problems, and impairment of uncontrolled diabetes
personal/behavioral function. The court disagreed

33

Id., at 350.
'Likes v. Callahan 112 F. 3d 189 (5th Cir. 1997).
3'Porch v. Chater 115 F. 3d 567 (8th Cir. 1997).
36
Id., at 57.
3'Quinones v. Chatter 117 F. 3d 29 (2nd Cir. 1997).
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sharply with the Agency over the weight to be accorded
testimony by psychologists who had found the minor
able to sustain her attention and work carefully on tasks
she enjoyed. Finding the reports "at best inconclusive,"
the court ruled that they "do not by themselves amount
to substantial evidence" when compared with reports of
the minor's teachers "who dealt with her on a daily
basis."38 Remand was deemed necessary, despite the
unanimity on disposition of the case among the ALJ,
Commission and district court, because "the record in
this case simply does not contain substantial evidence to
support the finding that Jennifer's impairment in the
domain of concentration, persistence and pace is less
than moderate."39
Schaal v. Apfel 4° in which a unanimous Second Circuit
panel upheld the ALJ's credibility finding regarding
claimant's testimony and affirmed the district court's
ruling that the ALJ had sufficiently developed the
record regarding claimant's mental condition during the
relevant period but nonetheless remanded the case to the
Agency to reweigh the evidence because "we are unable
to determine with certainty what legal standard the ALJ
applied in verifying the medical opinion of plaintiff's
treating physician" and because "the ALJ failed to
supply 'good reason' for discounting that opinion
required by SSA regulations."'"

3
39

Id., at 35.
1d.

4134 F. 3d 496 (2nd Cir. 1998).
Qid., at 506. That these illustrations were not aberrations is supported by other court
of appeals reversals of SSA cases from 1996 to 1998, particularly though not exclusively, by
Eighth Cir. panels. See, e.g., Hutchison v. Chater, 99 F. 3d 286 (8th Cir. 1996) insisting that
"Regardless of whether the Commissioner formally announces her acquiescence.... she is still
bound by the law of this Cir. and does not have the discretion to decide whether to adhere to
it." Id at 287; Pratts v. Chater, 94 F. 3d 34 (2nd Cir. 1996) ruling that the AL's' finding that
the grids set forth in Agency regulations required the conclusion that claimant was not disabled
was "legal error" where the ALJ neither identified the claimant's nonexertional limitations nor
considered whether a vocational expert was necessary; Stieberger v. Apfel, 134 F. 3d 37 (2nd
Cir. 1997), a "protracted" case dating back more than a dozen years, concluding that a district
court has jurisdiction to review the Agency's determination that an unrepresented claimant was
not so impaired as to lack adequate comprehension and that such review is subject to the
traditional substantial evidence test; Lucy v. Chater, 113 F. 3d 905 (8th Cir. 1997) ruling that
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These recent examples of divergence between courts of appeals
and the Agency were especially noteworthy because the ALJs and the
Agency were in agreement in every instance. SSA's genuine problem
is with its relationship with reviewing courts, not with compliance by
its ALJs with its policies. Instead of preoccupation with ALJs'
conformity to Agency policy, SSA would do well to implement a
collegial relationship with its ALJs and to enlist them as the
professional, impartial colleagues they are in heightening courts of
appeals' understanding of, coordination with and deference to the
records and findings of the ALJs and the Agency. Bound to exacerbate
conflict between the Agency and the reviewing courts would be further
memoranda confining ALJ decisional independence and elevating
adherence to Agency policy over acquiescence with court rulings.
Certainty that ALJs and Agency are in agreement because independent
professional judgments coalesce--and not because the ALJs are obliged
to genuflect to Agency political power--could produce effective
incentives for appellate judges to eschew micro-management and
second-guessing of the Agency and instead, to broaden Chevron-type
deference in SSA cases.42
c)

Implementing a collegial approach toward SSA-ALJ ties

A collegial approach to SSA-ALJ ties could commence ideally
with tabling the Fried memorandum and with instituting colloquia
among Agency officials and ALJs on key administrative procedure
issues that highlight and compare federal agencies' experiences with
court reversals and remands. Monitoring and assessing courts' actions
and rationales--especially those that delay and impede putting closure on
impartially administered and adjudged SSA cases, warrant systematic

the ALJ should not have determined that the claimant could engage in the full range of
sedentary work without consulting a vocational expert and that the AL's findings regarding
claimant's residual functional capacity were not supported by substantial evidence; Trossauer
v. Chater 121 F. 3d 341 (8th Cir. 1997) ruling that the ALJ improperly discredited testimony
of the claimant's treating physician in deciding that claimant was not disabled before the date
she was last insured for disability benefits; Taylor v. Chater, 118 F. 3d 1274 (8th Cir. 1997)
reversing the denial of a claim for disability and supplemental security income benefits because
the ALJ improperly rejected claimant's testimony as not credible; and Kelly v. Callahan, 133.
F. 3d 583 (8th Cir. 1998) reversing and remanding denial of a claim because the ALJ
disregarded the opinions of Kelly's treating physicians and instead credited the opinions of
consultative physicians who had not examined the claimant.
42
Chevron USA v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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analyses and consideration of alternative responses through interactions
of the experienced, skilled minds of the ALJ corps and those of
management officials. Some judges no doubt prefer micro-management
to deference by their temperament, but I surmise that other judges may
yet be unconvinced that ALJs invariably exercise dispassionate,
impartial and independent judgment in their decisions, free from
pressures and politics. Heightening commitment to reaffirming, rather
than confining, ALJ decisional independence would be a constructive
step toward collegiality within the Agency and toward more successful
experiences with the appellate court system. Deference to their
construction of their governing statutes is a wise and effective policy for
courts to follow vis i vis administrative agencies. But deference has
typically been earned as a product of trust and respect. The Chevron
doctrine has its roots in the feasibility of trust between courts and
administrative agencies. A major producer of trust is a pervasive record
of adherence to highest standards of impartiality.
Although annual conventions of Social Security ALJs have
consistently probed problems and issues of evidence--especially
substantiality of evidence--the colloquia I propose among ALJs and
Agency officials could profitably focus on the meaning for ALJs and the
Agency conveyed by recent Administrative Law decisions of the
Supreme Court, especially reversals of other federal agencies' actions by
Justices on grounds of agency failure to meet the requirement of
substantial evidence. The 1998 decision in Allentown Mack Sales and
Service v. National Labor Relations Board3 would be excellent for
starting.
The sharply split Justices ruled by a 5-4 vote that the NLRB
ALJ's factual findings that Allentown lacked a good faith reasonable
doubt about the union local's majority status was not supported by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole. By an equally split 5-4
majority, the Supreme Court rejected Allentown's contention that the
NLRB also violated the Administrative Procedure Act prohibition
against arbitrary and capricious administrative action.
Analogizing the requirement that agency factual findings be
supported by substantial evidence to the obligations of "a reasonable
jury," Justice Scalia concluded that a reasonable jury could not have
43

Allentown Mack Sales and Service v. National Labor Relations Board, 118 L. Ed.,
2d 797 (1998).
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found that Allentown lacked a good faith reasonable doubt about
whether the union local enjoyed continued employee support. "The
Board's finding to the contrary rests on a refusal to credit probative
circumstantial evidence and on evidentiary demands that go beyond the
substantive standard the Board purports to apply.""
Together with Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy and
Thomas, Justice Scalia rejected the agency's argument that the record
contained substantial evidence for the factual findings, with regard to
which the NLRB and its ALJ were in full agreement. The Justices
examined details of employees' testimony before the ALJ and were
incisively critical of the findings and inferences the ALJ and the Board
drew from employee statements. The Board cannot, consistent with the
substantial evidence standard "covertly transform its presumption of
continuing majority support into a working assumption that all of a
successor's employees support the unions until proved otherwise."45
Notwithstanding his ruling that the NLRB did not violate the
arbitrary and capricious standard, Justice Scalia concluded, "We think
it quite impossible for a rational fact finder to avoid the conclusion that
Allentown had reasonable good faith grounds to doubt ... the union's
retention of majority support."46 It is worth reiterating that the ALJ, the
Agency, and a majority of the Court of Appeals supported the findings;
but the five person majority of the Supreme Court rejected them--not
exactly an illustration of deference.
In an acerbic dissent, Justice Breyer charged the majority with
rewriting a Board rule without adequate justification. Quoting from
Justice Frankfurter's Universal Camera decision in 1951, the four
Justices in the minority maintained that whether there is substantial
evidence in the record as a whole to support agency findings "is a
question which Congress has placed in the keeping of the Courts of
' The Board's factual findings, Justice Breyer insisted, were
Appeals."47
supported by "both reason and experience."4 He concluded ominously
that the majority's opinion "will, I fear, weaken the system for judicial
review of administrative action that this Court's precedents have
carefully constructed over several decades."49
4Id.,
at 824.
4
51d., at 825.
46

Id.

47

Id., at 833.

4"Id.,

at 836.

49Id., at 836.
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A colloquium on the content, contexts and implications for
substantial evidence review of the Allentown case could provide a
heartening launch for a new era of collegiality in SSA-ALJ ties.

